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In early 2011, a Tunisian fruit vendor 
named Muhammad Bouazizi set him-
self on fire to protest the harassment 
he had apparently received from cor-
rupt municipal bureaucrats. The match 
he lighted ignited popular uprisings across 
the Arab-speaking world that became 
known as the Arab Spring. One by one, authori-
tarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen were 
swept away, as younger citizens turned out en masse to 
vent their anger at the barriers they faced in securing 
education, finding jobs, starting small businesses, par-
ticipating in civil society – and, in some cases, establish-
ing Islamic fundamentalism.
Yet, while republican governments toppled, the 
region’s monarchies proved to be made of sterner stuff. 
Absolutist domains, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Cairo, January 2011 
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Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, man-
aged to buy off opposition by using their 
abundant oil revenues to create jobs and to 
sweeten consumer subsidies. 
This tactic, however, fails to account for 
the survival of the monarchies in Jordan and 
Morocco, which have little wealth to spread 
on troubled waters. And it isn’t entirely con-
vincing in the case of Oman, where the gov-
ernment did throw some money at the prob-
lem but where protests were never as serious 
as in the major Arab Spring countries. 
By the same token, while financial and 
military assistance from Saudi Arabia almost 
certainly saved a fourth Mideast monarchy, 
Bahrain, from regime change, there is scant 
evidence that foreign aid made a substantial 
difference in Oman, Jordan or Morocco. On 
closer examination, it appears that, rather 
than money or armed might, the three king-
Sanaa, yemen, December 2011 – rally to commemorate the death of Mohamed bouazizi
Libya, February 2011 - Mummar Gaddafi’s crackdown











doms’ ongoing enlightened domestic policy 
choices – particularly as they related to eco-
nomic freedom, corruption and governance – 
shielded them from the tsunami.
In 2011, the year of the uprisings, Oman 
(57), Jordan (61) and Morocco (43) all scored 
decently on the World Bank Governance 
Index’ ranking on control of corruption, 
where a score of 100 is best. Meanwhile, many 
of the regimes destabilized by the Arab Spring 
– Libya (5), Iran (19), Syria (16) and Yemen (9) 
– certainly did not. Similarly, Oman (69), Jor-
dan (69) and Morocco (60) did well in com-
parison with Libya (60), Iran (42), Syria (51) 
and Yemen (54) on the Heritage/WSJ Index 
of Economic Freedom that same year. (In this 
index, a high score means more freedom.) 
To be sure, Tunisia and Egypt don’t fit 
cleanly into this simple matrix. And, with 
hindsight, there are plenty of reasons to treat 
them as unique. Both, for example, had large 
middle classes alienated by rapidly widening 
income inequality and conspicuous con-
sumption by the newly rich. Both, moreover, 
had cities teeming with unskilled and often 
unemployed workers displaced from the 
countryside. I’ll focus here on the three little 
monarchies that have largely been left out of 
the Arab Spring conversation and managed 
to beat the odds.
AT A GLANCE
 OMAN JORDAN MOROCCO
GDP  
($ billions, 2012, PPP)   .  .  .  .  .  . $92  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .39  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .174
GDP Growth  
(2012)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .5%  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2.8%  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3%
GDP/Capita  
(2012, PPP)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . $29,600  .  .  .  .  .6,100  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .5,400
Population  
(millions, 2013)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3.2   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .6.5   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .32.6
Population Growth  
(2013)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2.08%   .  .  .  .  .  .0.14%  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1.04%
Total Fertility Rate  
(2013)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2.86  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3.32  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2.17
Oil Production  
(barrels/day, 2012)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .900,000   .  .  .  .165,000   .  .  .  .  .680,000
Infant Mortality  
(deaths/1,000, 2012)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .14  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .15  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .25
Life Expectancy at Birth  
(2012)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .75  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .80  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .76
source: CIA World Factbook
Algeria, March 2011 


















TThe impact of good governance in general and good policy choices in particular is clear in the case of Oman, the lightly populated, largely Arab sultanate on the Indian Ocean side of the strategic Strait of Hormuz. It has consistently achieved growth rates above 
those of its oil-producing counterparts in the 
Gulf. Indeed, it has grown from poverty to 
high-income status in the last half century, 
and now has a per capita income of close to 
$30,000 in purchasing-power terms – a shade 
less than that of New Zealand. 
Oman began its development efforts in 
the early 1970s under Sultan Qaboos, who es-
chewed doctrinaire rigidity in an era marked 
by the ideological contest between socialism 
and capitalism. (And later, between Iran and 
its Sunni neighbors; Oman has solid relations 
with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.) 
Central to Oman’s growth strategy has been 
the paradoxical role of oil. Since the discovery 
of oil in the mid-1960s, Oman’s monarchs 
have decreed that petroleum revenue was to be 
invested for the benefit of future generations. 
Thus, on the one hand, Oman has attempted to 
maximize the impact of oil revenues through 
effective resource development and allocation 
policies. On the other, the government has 
long been conscious that, because of its rela-
tively modest reserves, the sultanate is under 
the gun to reduce the economy’s dependence 
on oil by developing new sources of income.
When the country’s state-led growth began 
to stall in the 1990s, the sultan responded fa-
vorably to IMF and World Bank pressure for 
market and trade liberalization. The new 
strategy, Vision 2020, called for opening the 
economy, with a much greater emphasis on 
private development. To accomplish this, 
controls on foreign investment were lifted 
and expanded contacts were sought with in-
ternational organizations, including the WTO 
and regional economic blocs. 
Unfortunately, the country’s development 
efforts have been accompanied by breakneck 
population growth. The total fertility rate ap-
proached an astounding eight children per 
woman in the 1980s, even as infant mortality 
was collapsing and life was being extended by 
better health care and sanitation. The number 
of citizens grew from fewer than 500,000 in 
1970 to nearly two million today. And while 
the total fertility rate is now below three, the 
demographic elephant has yet to be fully di-
gested by the proverbial python. 
Oman’s youth unemployment is estimated 
at around 30 percent, with nearly 100,000 ad-
ditional youths leaving secondary school each 
year. Speedy population growth and limits on 
petroleum revenues to finance industrializa-
Sultan Qaboos
Oman
















tion are certainly exacerbating the problem. 
But at the heart of Oman’s unemployment 
problem – a problem shared with all the Per-
sian Gulf petro-states – is its continued reli-
ance on foreigners to fill jobs ranging from 
middle management to manual labor.
To combat this dependence, an “Omaniza-
tion” initiative encouraging Omanis to find 
alternatives to public employment by shifting 
the emphasis of education toward technical 
and vocational skills has been imposed. Oman 
also introduced several programs to encour-
age entrepreneurship. The Fund for Develop-
ment of Youth Projects, started in 1999, bank-
rolls Omanis willing to start small- and 
medium-size enterprises; likewise, the 2001 
SANAD Program aims to speed up Omaniza-
tion through self-employment. 
A third program, the Sharakah Fund for 
Development of Youth Projects, provides fi-
nancing options for young Omanis starting 
or expanding businesses with total project 
costs of less than one million Omani rials 
(about $2.6 million). The fund offers entre-
preneurs more flexibility than privately raised 
equity, encouraging business owners to buy 
back the fund’s equity share within six years. 
The idea is to ensure that young entrepre-
neurs have the short-term financing they 
need without repayment deadlines, as well as 
the long-term option of regaining complete 
ownership of their enterprises.
But in spite of efforts at Omanization, de-
pendence on expatriate workers in Oman, 
once one of the lowest among the Gulf Coop-
eration Council states, jumped from 24 per-
cent in 2003 to about 44 percent in 2013. As 
in the other oil-rich Gulf countries, poor 
work habits, unrealistically high minimum 
wages and a pervasive sense of entitlement 
make employers loath to hire locals.
Only time will tell if policy changes will re-
verse the trend. The creation of a more robust 
small- and medium-size enterprise sector 
could have far-reaching effects by contribut-
ing to job creation and diversification, while 
generating more innovation and stronger 
competition among businesses. 
oman’s fertility rate pushed the population from fewer than 500,000 in 1970 to  nearly two million today












JJordan’s situation is the most precarious of the monarchies. The country is resource-poor and situated where many of the region’s problems are actively playing out – Jordan borders Israel, Syria, Iraq and the West Bank, and is a stone’s throw across the Gulf of 
Aqaba from Egypt. What’s more, it is home to 
1.5 million Palestinians displaced by conflict 
with Israel, who in the past have challenged 
the political dominance of ethnic Hashemite 
Arabs. Despite its many problems, though, 
the kingdom withstood the stresses of the 
Arab Spring with no sign of cracking. 
That achievement is in part attributable to 
ongoing economic and po-
litical reforms. Two years 
after regime change in Tu-
nisia, King Abdullah II 
seems committed to an 
ambitious agenda for giv-
ing Jordanians a greater 
voice in government and 
raising living standards. 
His plans include a series 
of initiatives to directly ad-
dress many of the coun-
try’s longstanding impedi-
ments to prosperity.
Jordan has experienced 
relatively strong growth in the last decade: the 
rate has been as high as 10 percent and never 
slipped below 2 percent during the global 
financial crisis. Nonetheless, the official un-
employment rate has hovered at 13 percent 
and the unofficial rate is closer to 30 percent. 
Indeed, to absorb all the entrants into the 
labor force each year would require real GDP 
growth of around 9 percent annually, far 
above the rate that Jordan – or any other 
country outside Southeast Asia – has been 
able to sustain.  
Job creation is further complicated by the 
tightening fiscal constraints facing the gov-
ernment. The Jordanian economy was cer-
tainly buffeted by the shock waves of the Arab 
Spring coming from multiple directions. First, 
supplies of natural gas from Egypt (pur-
chased below market price) were disrupted by 
sabotage, costing the kingdom billions to re-
place. Then, tourism was hit, as fears of un-
rest kept visitors away. Next, the Syrian con-
flict dislocated Jordan’s trade with Turkey, 
adding significant transport costs to many of 
Jordan’s key exports. Finally, an influx of 
more than 400,000 refugees from the Syrian 
civil war strained the government’s financial 
resources, which were already stretched to 
meet the needs of long-term 
Palestinian refugees and the 
remnants of the Iraqi dias-
pora from the war.
Why, then, did Jordan es-
cape the Arab Spring with 
aplomb? Sara Tobin, an an-
thropologist at Northeastern 
University, argues that the 
emergent middle class in 
Amman, with its sense of “as-
piring cosmopolitanism,” has 
reoriented critical groups of 
Jordanians away from ethnic 
strife and radical politics. De-
spite the very real divide between economi-
cally and culturally globalized West Amman 
and working-class Palestinians concentrated 
in East Amman, the separation is blurring as 
increasing numbers of the latter are crossing 
into West Amman for work and leisure.
Most development economists argue that 
Jordan
King Abdullah II













growth promotes political stability only if it 
nourishes social mobility. And by no coinci-
dence, Jordan’s development policy empha-
sizes the encouragement of small- and 
medium-size enterprises. Modest-scale busi-
nesses in Jordan are already a crucial part of 
the economy, with SMEs accounting for 
around 40 percent of GDP and 70 percent of 
employment. Like Oman, Jordan has laid a 
solid foundation for private-sector activity, 
with a steady improvement in governance 
and investment in social cohesion that would 
appear to support bottom-up expansion.
However, Jordanian SMEs have tradition-
ally faced a number of hurdles – it still ranks 
just 119th out of 189 countries on the World 
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index. This ap-
plies particularly to obtaining financial sup-
port. Jordanian banks have been reluctant to 
lend to SMEs, which are typically unable or 
unwilling to provide the financial transpar-
ency that the banks require. That increases 
dependence on extended family and friends, 
as well as personal savings, for capital.  
Note, too, that SMEs often engage in un-
registered economic activities that, thanks in 
part to a blizzard of government regulation, 
business owners are reluctant to formalize via 
the kind of reporting a bank would require. 
Thus in 2012, SMEs received only around 
one-tenth of all the loans extended by finan-
cial institutions.
To free up financing for smaller enter-
prises, a new fund was established by the 
Ministry of Planning and International Co-
operation and the Jordan Loan Guarantee 
Corporation (JLGC) in August 2012. Under 
this scheme, the JLGC will guarantee up to 70 
percent of loans taken by firms participating 
in the scheme, up to a maximum of 100,000 
Jordanian dinars (about $140,000). A sepa-
rate track facilitates loans of a maximum 
15,000 dinars to microbusiness. 
Meanwhile, foreign donors – notably, 
USAID and OPIC – are also working to in-
crease access to lending. The NGO Global 
Communities operates an initiative called the 
Jordan Loan Guarantee Facility, which guar-
antees up to 70 percent of loans from com-
mercial banks to SMEs and gives banks tech-
nical support to improve their capacity for 
assessing risk in the sector. 
young entrepreneurs work on their laptops at the Amman-based oasis 500, a seed investment firm 





MMorocco’s pre-Arab Spring position resem-bled that of Jordan in a number of ways. Both were constitutional monarchies that gave the king effective control of public policy. Both had pursued very gradual paths toward true parliamentary democracy. And both escaped 
the season of discontent without violence or 
true regime change. But their politics and 
economics are quite distinct.  
In June 2011, a popular referendum in 
Morocco approved a new constitution under 
which the king was no longer to be called “sa-
cred;” moreover, he must appoint a prime 
minister from the party with the most parlia-
mentary seats. And the following November, 
voters for the first time favored the avowedly 
Islamist Party of Justice and Development 
(PJD). This important change, which took 
place without violence, inspired speculation 
that Morocco had managed a “third way” – 
incremental Islamic democratization. Maybe, 
they say, Morocco could be a model for other 
Mideast monarchies.
Perhaps. But it is important to bear in mind 
that the PJD hardly resembles the conservative 
Islamist parties vying for power in Egypt and 
Tunisia, or the fundamentalist groups that 
have risen to prominence in Gaza and Syria. It 
followed, rather than led, the protests in the 
wake of upheaval in Tunisia and Egypt. And it 
was quick to accept a compromise with the 
monarch that transferred relatively little power 
to the parliament. Arguably most important – 
and in contrast to other Islamic parties – the 
JPD has espoused a neo-liberal, market- 
oriented approach to economic reform.
Indeed, it turns out that the policies es-
poused by the JPD are fairly consistent with 
Morocco’s existing growth strategy. That 
strategy can be loosely characterized as “in-
clusive growth,” with a focus on job creation, 
economic mobility, equal access to govern-
ment services and a reduction in poverty. 
This may sound like the boilerplate served 
up by any number of incumbent regimes 
seeking popular support without accepting 
radical reform. But to the surprise of cynics, 
Morocco has achieved some successes. GDP 
per capita (measured in today’s purchasing 
power) rose from $3,200 in 2003 to $4,500 a 
decade later. And the rising tide has carried a 
lot of boats: the portion of the population 
that fell beneath the national poverty line de-
creased from about 16 percent in 1999 to less 
than 9 percent in 2008. A word of caution is 
in order, though: high income inequality per-
sists and has even increased slightly in both 
urban and rural areas. 
After the outbreak of Moroccan protests 
and Arab Spring uprisings in neighboring 
countries, the king announced the accelera-
tion of the already existing decentralization 
Morocco's King Mohammed VI
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of development planning and management. 
This approach, which devolves control to 
local authorities, reflects the government’s 
stated desire to build democratic capitalism 
from the bottom up. The rationale is that de-
velopment projects designed by local citizens 
have a greater chance of follow-though and a 
smaller chance of regression.
The Moroccan model seems to fit the re-
gion in the sense that it focuses on increasing 
social cohesion by reducing poverty while 
identifying with the Islamic concepts of shura 
(participation and mutual consultation re-
garding all matters involving the whole com-
munity), umma (a decentralized yet inte-
grated worldwide Muslim community that 
brings about human rights and social justice) 
and ijma (consensus building).
what next?
Forecasting events in the Middle East is prob-
ably a fool’s errand. That said, I would argue 
that these three monarchies have a real shot at 
pulling away from their neighbors in terms of 
both economic development and progress to-
ward true democracy. They have laid a more 
solid foundation for sustaining prosperity. 
Moreover, their rulers have not alienated a 
great majority of citizens – strikingly, Arab 
Spring protestors did not demand the abdica-
tion of the monarch in any of them. One 
could go even further and speculate that all 
three may be on the verge of a virtuous circle 
in which a young and increasingly influential 
entrepreneurial class helps reform-willing 
governments to sustain the push for growth, 
social mobility and job creation in a part of 
the world not known for paths of moderation. 
Still, these countries face daunting obsta-
cles. At a time of heightened economic expec-
tations but limited government resources, 
they all face a youth bulge that is far too large 
for the public sector to absorb in make-work 
jobs. With education systems hard-pressed to 
provide skills needed by productive, export-
oriented industries and limited political lee-
way for labor market reform, youth unem-
ployment will present one of the greatest 
challenges to the each country’s stability. 
If private-sector jobs are not created at the 
breakneck pace of labor market entry, each 
may find itself overwhelmed by restless popu-
lations and political interests peddling reli-
gious or statist fixes. In this regard, the one 
sure thing each monarchy has in its favor is 
the fact that their populations have witnessed 
the doleful consequences of alternative paths 
taken in Egypt and Syria.
Post-election celebration, november 2011
Prime Minister Abdelilah benkirane
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